基于原子混淆的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法

邹德清; 张盼; 刘伟; 陈维杰; 陆弈帆

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022014

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基于原子混淆的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法

学术论文 | 更新时间：2024-06-03

- 基于原子混淆的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法
- Universal patching method for side-channel vulnerabilities based on atomic obfuscation
- 网络与信息安全学报 2022年8卷第2期页码：100-111
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 大数据技术与系统国家地方联合工程研究中心，湖北武汉 430074
  2. 服务计算技术与系统教育部重点实验室，湖北武汉 430074
  3. 大数据安全湖北省工程研究中心，湖北武汉 430074
  4. 华中科技大学网络空间安全学院，湖北武汉 430074
  5. 北京京航计算通讯研究所，100089 北京
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "邹德清（1975− ），男，湖南长沙人，博士，华中科技大学教授、博士生导师，主要研究方向为虚拟化安全与云安全、网络攻防与漏洞检测、大数据安全、容错计算" ]
  [ "张盼（1991− ），男，湖北仙桃人，华中科技大学博士生，主要研究方向为系统安全、虚拟化安全、编译器安全、模糊测试、侧信道防御" ]
  [ "刘伟（1980− ），男，江苏扬州人，北京京航计算通讯研究所研究员，主要研究方向为软件安全性设计与验证、信息安全、软件及FPGA工程化及测试" ]
  [ "陈维杰（1999− ），男，江苏泰州人，华中科技大学硕士生，主要研究方向为系统安全，侧信道防御" ]
  [ "陆弈帆（1998− ），男，江苏苏州人，华中科技大学硕士生，主要研究方向为系统安全、模糊测试、漏洞检测" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金;The National Natural Science Foundation of China(62172168)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022014
  中图分类号： TP393
- 网络首发：2022-04，
  
  纸质出版：2022-04-15
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
邹德清, 张盼, 刘伟, 等. 基于原子混淆的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2022,8(2):100-111.

Deqing ZOU, Pan ZHANG, Wei LIU, et al. Universal patching method for side-channel vulnerabilities based on atomic obfuscation[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(2): 100-111.
邹德清, 张盼, 刘伟, 等. 基于原子混淆的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2022,8(2):100-111. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022014.

Deqing ZOU, Pan ZHANG, Wei LIU, et al. Universal patching method for side-channel vulnerabilities based on atomic obfuscation[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(2): 100-111. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022014.

摘要

包含侧信道漏洞的代码在程序被执行时会表现出与输入有关的非功能性行为，攻击者利用微架构的侧信道攻击可获取这些行为，并通过分析行为与输入之间的关联模式恢复应用数据内容，达到窃取用户机密数据的目的。软件层的侧信道漏洞修补方法带给程序的性能损耗较低，并且因为无须修改硬件或系统，可实现快速修补和大范围部署，成为密码算法实现采用的主流策略。现有修补方案与程序的具体实现深度绑定，需要人工介入，存在实现难度大、不通用的问题。针对以上问题，提出了一种结合动态混淆技术和硬件原子事务特性的通用侧信道漏洞修补方法。所提方法向侧信道漏洞代码中插入动态混淆访存操作，以达到隐藏真实访存地址的目的，并将漏洞代码和混淆访存封装为硬件原子事务，保障被封装的代码在运行时连续执行而不被中断，避免攻击者利用细粒度的侧信道攻击区分真实的访存操作和混淆的访存操作。基于LLVM编译器实现了原型系统SC-Patcher，引入了包括安全跳板和原子事务聚合等在内的多种设计，提高了方法的安全性和实用性。安全与性能测试结果表明，使用所提方法完成侧信道漏洞修补的程序，在几乎未增加额外性能开销的同时，能够有效抵抗侧信道攻击，防范攻击者从漏洞处还原有效的机密数据内容。

Abstract

Executing code containing side-channel vulnerabilities exhibits different non-functional behaviors related to inputs.Attackers can obtain these behaviors by leveraging micro architecture side-channel attacks and then analyze the pattern between the behaviors and the inputs to access sensitive data.Vulnerability repairing at the software layer brings low overheads to a program’s execution.Besides

it does not require modifying hardware or system

which enables fast patching and widespread deployment.It becomes the mainstream strategy applied to the current cryptographic implementations.However

existing solutions are deeply bound to the program’s implementation and requires manual intervention.This brings challenge to implement and is not versatile enough.A general patching method was proposed for side-channel vulnerabilities that combined dynamic obfuscated execution with hardware atomic transaction.To hide the real accesses of the side-channel vulnerabilities of a program

the proposed method inserted dynamic confusing accesses into the vulnerabilities.To avoid an attacker using fine-grained side-channel attack to distinguish the real access and the confusing access

both of them were encapsulated as transactions and they were guaranteed to be uninterrupted during the running period.In addition

a prototype system called SC-Patcher was implemented based on the LLVM compiler.Various optimization strategies were supported

including secure springboard and transaction aggregation

to further improve system security and performance.Experimental results show that the proposed method makes it impossible for an attacker to restore accurate sensitive data through side-channel attack

and it also brings almost no additional performance overhead to the program.

关键词

Keywords

references

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