基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计

余佳仁; 田有亮; 林晖

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022002

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基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计

学术论文 | 更新时间：2024-06-03

- 基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计
- Design of miner type identification mechanism based on reputation management model
- 网络与信息安全学报 2022年8卷第1期页码：128-138
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院，贵州贵阳 550025
  2. 贵州省公共大数据重点实验室，贵州贵阳 550025
  3. 福建师范大学数学与信息学院，福建福州 350117
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "余佳仁（1996− ），男，湖北黄冈人，贵州大学硕士生，主要研究方向为区块链" ]
  [ "田有亮（1982− ），男，贵州盘县人，博士，贵州大学教授、博士生导师，主要研究方向为密码学与安全协议、大数据隐私保护与区块链技术等" ]
  [ "林晖（1977− ），男，福建福州人，博士，福建师范大学教授，主要研究方向为边缘计算、区块链、信任管理等" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金资助项目;The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61662009);国家自然科学基金资助项目;The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61772008);贵州省科技重大专项计划基金;The Major Scientific and Technological Special Project of Guizhou Province,China(20183001);国家自然科学基金联合基金重点支持项目;Key Program of the National Natural Science Union Foundation of China(U1836205);贵州省科技计划项目;Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2019]1098);贵州省高层次创新型人才项目;Project of High-level Innovative Talents of Guizhou Province([2020]6008)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022002
  中图分类号： TP309
- 网络首发：2022-02，
  
  纸质出版：2022-02-15
- 稿件说明：
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余佳仁, 田有亮, 林晖. 基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2022,8(1):128-138.

Jiaren YU, Youliang TIAN, Hui LIN. Design of miner type identification mechanism based on reputation management model[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(1): 128-138.
余佳仁, 田有亮, 林晖. 基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2022,8(1):128-138. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022002.

Jiaren YU, Youliang TIAN, Hui LIN. Design of miner type identification mechanism based on reputation management model[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(1): 128-138. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022002.

摘要

在公开矿池中，矿工可以随意进入矿池提交工作量证明从而获得奖励，矿工的条件约束类型不同。因此，会出现恶意矿工提交无效工作量和矿工在矿池中不提交工作量的情况，占用矿池的验证计算资源，降低矿池的验证效率，导致矿池系统崩溃。针对矿池中难以分辨矿工类型而导致矿池系统崩溃的问题，引入信誉管理机制对矿工的行为进行衡量，部署合约防止矿工与矿池管理者合谋，提出一种基于信誉管理模型的矿工类型鉴别机制设计。构造信誉机制对矿工的行为进行衡量，当矿工进行恶意行为时，会调低矿工的信誉值。当矿工的信誉值小于矿池的信誉阈值时，系统会剔除该矿工，从而该矿工不能再进入矿池提交工作量证明，获得奖励。根据马尔可夫过程中的矿工行为状态转移，对矿池中的矿工进行动态更新，从而使得矿池中的矿工都在进行诚实的行为，提交工作量证明。同时，设计一种奖励制度对矿池中的矿工进行激励，在矿池中部署智能合约，防止矿工与矿池管理者进行共谋。从安全性和性能上对方案进行分析，证明所提方案不仅在矿工提交工作量证明过程中是安全的，并且解决了在公开矿池中矿工类型的鉴别问题，从而解决恶意矿工提交无效工作量的问题，剔除恶意矿工，避免矿池验证无效工作量，提高矿池的验证效率。

Abstract

In the public mining pool

miners can freely enter the mining pool to submit proof of work to obtain rewards

and there are no conditions to restrict different types of miners.There will be malicious miners submitting invalid workloads and miners not submitting workloads in the mining pool

occupying the verification computing resources of the mining pool

reducing the verification efficiency of the mining pool

and causing the mining pool system to collapse.Aiming at the problem that it is difficult to distinguish the type of miners in the mining pool

which leads to the collapse of the mining pool system

a reputation management mechanism was introduced to measure the behavior of miners

and contracts were deployed to prevent miners from colluding with the pool manager.A design of miner type identification mechanism based on reputation management model was proposed.A reputation mechanism was constructed to measure the behavior of miners.When a miner conducts malicious behavior

the miner's reputation value would be lowered.When the miner's reputation value was less than the reputation threshold of the mining pool

the system would remove the miner

so that the miner can no longer enter the mining pool to submit proof of work and get rewards.The miners in the mining pool were dynamically updated by Markov process

so that the miners in the mining pool were conducting honest behaviors and submitting proof of work.At the same time

a reward system was designed to motivate the miners in the mining pool

and smart contracts were deployed in the mining pool to prevent miners from collusion with the mining pool manager.Finally

analyzing the scheme from the perspective of security and performance

the proposed scheme was not only safe in the process of miners submitting proof of workload

but also solved the problem of identifying miner types in public mining pools

thereby solving the problem of malicious miners submitting invalid workloads

eliminating malicious miners

and avoiding mining pools verifying invalid workloads

to improve the verification efficiency of the mining pool.

关键词

Keywords

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