基于博弈论的安全多方计算的研究

张兴兰; 郑炜

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2018010

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基于博弈论的安全多方计算的研究

学术论文 | 更新时间：2024-06-03

- 基于博弈论的安全多方计算的研究
- Research on security multi-party computing based on game theory
- 网络与信息安全学报 2018年4卷第1期页码：52-56
- 作者机构：
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "张兴兰（1970-），女，山西吕梁人，博士，北京工业大学教授，主要研究方向为密码学和安全协议。" ]
  [ "郑炜（1989-），男，河北石家庄人，北京工业大学硕士生，主要研究方向为密码学、博弈论及安全多方计算。" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金资助项目;The National Natural Science Foundation of China(10007016201201)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2018010
  中图分类号： TP309
- 网络首发：2018-01，
  
  纸质出版：2018-01-15
- 稿件说明：
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张兴兰, 郑炜. 基于博弈论的安全多方计算的研究[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2018,4(1):52-56.

Xinglan ZHANG, Wei ZHENG. Research on security multi-party computing based on game theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2018, 4(1): 52-56.
张兴兰, 郑炜. 基于博弈论的安全多方计算的研究[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2018,4(1):52-56. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2018010.

Xinglan ZHANG, Wei ZHENG. Research on security multi-party computing based on game theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2018, 4(1): 52-56. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2018010.

摘要

在经典的百万富翁协定中，参与者其中之一获取到财产大小的结论后，有可能不告诉另外一个参与者，也可以不遵守这个协议，结合博弈论可以避免这个问题，一个参与者一定会选择做出对自己有利的决定，因此，可以设计一个协议，遵循这个协议的参与者获得的利益大于背离这个协议的利益。目前，基于博弈论的问题计算效率较低，该协议通过引入一个二叉树大大提高了计算效率。

Abstract

In the classic millionaire agreement

one party can get the final wealth comparison results

you can not tell the other party

you can not comply with this agreement

combined with game theory can avoid this problem

you can make the participants away from the agreement proceeds less than compliance with the agreement

compliance with the agreement is the optimal strategy for the participant.At present

the problem of computational efficiency based on game theory is low

and the protocol greatly improves the computational efficiency by introducing a binary tree.

关键词

Keywords

references

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