Global randomized consensus algorithm resist collusion attack based on game theory

Bao ZHANG; Youliang TIAN; Sheng GAO

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022048

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Global randomized consensus algorithm resist collusion attack based on game theory

Papers | 更新时间：2024-06-03

- Global randomized consensus algorithm resist collusion attack based on game theory
- Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security Vol. 8, Issue 4, Pages: 98-109(2022)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院，贵州贵阳 550025
  2. 贵州省公共大数据重点实验室，贵州贵阳 550025
  3. 中央财经大学信息学院，北京 100081
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022048
  CLC： TP393
- Online First：2022-08，
  
  Published：15 August 2022
- 稿件说明：
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Bao ZHANG, Youliang TIAN, Sheng GAO. Global randomized consensus algorithm resist collusion attack based on game theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(4): 98-109.
DOI：

Bao ZHANG, Youliang TIAN, Sheng GAO. Global randomized consensus algorithm resist collusion attack based on game theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(4): 98-109. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022048.

摘要

随着区块链技术的不断发展，作为区块链技术基石的共识技术受到更多关注，共识技术的发展越发迅速，但依旧存在相关难题。容错类共识算法作为区块链共识技术的代表性之一，依然存在诸多难题待研究，针对容错类共识算法中节点随机性和节点共谋攻击问题进行了研究，提出基于博弈论抗共谋攻击的全局随机化共识算法，通过实现节点的随机化和解决相关安全问题提高区块链网络的安全性和吞吐量。在选择参与容错类共识算法的节点过程中，利用映射函数和加权随机函数实现发起者和验证者节点的全局随机化，从而保证发起者和验证者节点的身份匿名，提高区块链网络的安全性。利用信誉更新模型实现信誉动态更新的同时利用博弈论分析容错类共识算法的安全问题，构造更加正确和高效的算法模型以提高算法的吞吐量并分析发现这类算法中存在超过1/3节点的共谋攻击问题，利用精炼贝叶斯博弈构造共谋合约，分析求得共谋者之间的纳什均衡点，从而解决超过1/3节点的共谋攻击问题。通过安全性分析和实验表明，基于博弈论抗共谋攻击的全局随机化共识算法相对工作量证明（PoW，proof of work）、权益证明（PoS，proof of stake）和实用拜占庭容错（PBFT，practical Byzantine fault tolerance）共识算法不仅提高吞吐量、降低计算资源消耗，而且该算法抵抗分布式拒绝服务（DDoS，distributed denial of service）、Eclipse attacks和超过1/3节点共谋攻击。

Abstract

As the cornerstone of blockchain technology

consensus technology has received more attention with the continuous development of blockchain technology.The development of consensus technology has become more and more rapid

but there are still related problems.Nowadays

fault-tolerant consensus algorithms

as one of the representative blockchain consensus technologies

still have many problems to be studied.The problem of node randomness and node collusion attacks in fault-tolerant consensus algorithms had been studied

and a game-theoretic-based anti-corruption algorithm was proposed.The global randomization consensus algorithm of collusion attack improved the security and throughput of the blockchain network by realizing the randomization of nodes and solving related security problems.In the process of selecting nodes participating in the fault-tolerant consensus algorithm

the global randomization of the initiator and verifier nodes was realized by using the mapping function and the weighted random function

thereby ensuring the identity anonymity of the initiator and verifier nodes and improving the blockchain network security accordingly.The reputation update model was used to realize the dynamic update of the reputation

and the game theory was used to analyze the security problems of the fault-tolerant consensus algorithm.A more correct and efficient algorithm model was constructed to improve the throughput of the algorithm and analyze the problem of collusion attack of more than one third of the nodes in this kind of algorithm

the refined Bayesian game was used to construct a collusion contract and analyze the collusion The Nash equilibrium point between the two nodes was adopted to solve the collusion attack problem of more than one third of the nodes.The security analysis and experiments show that the global randomization consensus algorithm based on the game theory anti-collusion attack is better than PoW、PoS and PBFT.The consensus algorithm is not only effective to improve throughput and reduce computing resource consumption

but also resistant to DDoS

Eclipse attacks and collusion attacks by more than one third of nodes.

关键词

Keywords

references

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